Review of Sean McMeekin’s Book “Stalin’s War: A New History of World War II” Part Two
Sean McMeekin’s latest book Stalin’s War: A New History of World War II is a well-researched book that documents that World War II was a war that Josef Stalin—not Adolf Hitler—had wanted. McMeekin describes the literature on World War II as excessively German-centric. For Americans, Australians, Britons, Canadians and Western Europeans, World War II has always been Hitler’s war.
McMeekin states that, starting with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in September 1931 and ending with Japan’s final capitulation in September 1945, there were numerous wars on the planet. It would be a stretch to blame them all on Hitler, since Hitler was not in power in Germany when the Manchurian conflict erupted, and had been dead four months before Japan surrendered. McMeekin writes:
[I]t would make far more sense to choose someone who was alive and in power during the whole thing, whose armies fought in both Asia and Europe on a regular (if not uninterrupted) basis for the entire period, whose empire spanned the Eurasian continent that furnished the theater for most of the fighting and nearly all of the casualties, whose territory was coveted by the two main Axis aggressors, and who succeeded in defeating them both and massively enlarging his empire in the process—emerging, by any objective evaluation, as the victor inheriting the spoils of war, if at a price in Soviet lives (nearly 30 million) so high as to be unfathomable today. In all these ways, it was not Hitler’s, but Stalin’s, war.
As much as I admire McMeekin’s extensive research and focus on Stalin as the primary aggressor and beneficiary of World War II, he makes statements in Stalin’s War that I don’t agree with. This article focuses on these statements and conclusions that I think are either questionable or erroneous.
Hitler’s Declaration of War on the United States
Like most establishment historians, McMeekin writes that Adolf Hitler made a foolish mistake declaring war against the United States in his speech on December 11, 1941. However, U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt’s numerous provocations made it extremely difficult for Hitler not to declare war against the United States.
Roosevelt signed the Lend-Lease Act into law on March 11, 1941. This legislation marked the end of any pretense of neutrality on the part of the United States. Despite soothing assurances by Roosevelt that the United States would not get into the war, the adoption of the Lend-Lease Act was a decisive move which put America into an undeclared war in the Atlantic. It opened up an immediate appeal for naval action to ensure that munitions and supplies procured under the Lend-Lease Act would reach Great Britain.
The first wartime meeting between Roosevelt and Churchill began on August 9, 1941, in a conference at the harbor of Argentia in Newfoundland. The principal result of this conference was the signing of the Atlantic Charter on August 14, 1941. Roosevelt repeated to Churchill during this conference his predilection for an undeclared war, saying, “I may never declare war; I may make war. If I were to ask Congress to declare war, they might argue about it for three months.”
The Atlantic Charter was in effect a joint declaration of war aims, although Congress had not voted for American participation in the war. The Atlantic Charter, which provided for Anglo-American cooperation in policing the world after the Second World War, was a tacit but inescapable implication that the United States would soon become involved in the war. This implication is fortified by the large number of top military and naval staff personnel who were present at the conference.
Roosevelt’s next move toward war was the issuing of secret orders on August 25, 1941, to the Atlantic Fleet to attack and destroy German and Italian “hostile forces.” These secret orders resulted in an incident on September 4, 1941, between an American destroyer, the Greer, and a German submarine. Roosevelt falsely claimed in a fireside chat to the American public on September 11, 1941, that the German submarine had fired first.
The reality is that the Greer had tracked the German submarine for three hours, and broadcast the submarine’s location for the benefit of any British airplanes and destroyers which might be in the vicinity. The German submarine fired at the Greer only after a British airplane had dropped four depth charges which missed their mark. During this fireside chat Roosevelt finally admitted that, without consulting Congress or obtaining congressional sanction, he had ordered a shoot-on-sight campaign against Axis submarines.
On September 13, 1941, Roosevelt ordered the Atlantic Fleet to escort convoys in which there were no American vessels. This policy would make it more likely to provoke future incidents between American and German vessels. Roosevelt also agreed about this time to furnish Britain with “our best transport ships.” These included 12 liners and 20 cargo vessels manned by American crews to transport two British divisions to the Middle East.
More serious incidents followed in the Atlantic. On October 17, 1941, an American destroyer, the Kearny, dropped depth charges on a German submarine. The German submarine retaliated and hit the Kearny with a torpedo, resulting in the loss of 11 lives. An older American destroyer, the Reuben James, was sunk with a casualty list of 115 of her crew members. Some of her seamen were convinced the Reuben James had already sunk at least one U-boat before she was torpedoed by the German submarine.
Japan’s attack against the United States on December 7, 1941, at Pearl Harbor was the result of Roosevelt’s numerous provocations against Japan. On December 8, 1941, President Roosevelt made a speech to Congress calling for a declaration of war against Japan. Condemning the attack on Pearl Harbor as a “date which will live in infamy,” Roosevelt did not once mention Germany.
Hitler’s policy of keeping incidents between the United States and Germany to a minimum seemed to have succeeded. Hitler had ignored or downplayed the numerous provocations that Roosevelt had made against Germany. Even after Roosevelt issued orders to shoot-on-sight at German submarines, Hitler had ordered his naval commanders and air force to avoid incidents that Roosevelt might use to bring America into the war. Also, since the Tripartite Pact did not obligate Germany to join Japan in a war initiated by Japan, it appeared unlikely that Hitler would declare war on the United States.
Hitler’s decision to stay out of war with the United States was made more difficult on December 4, 1941, when the Chicago Tribune carried in huge black letters the headline: F.D.R.’s WAR PLANS! The Washington Times Herald, the largest paper in the nation’s capital, carried a similar headline.
Chesly Manly, the Tribune’s Washington correspondent, revealed in his report what Roosevelt had repeatedly denied: that Roosevelt was planning to lead the United States into war against Germany. The source of Manly’s information was no less than a verbatim copy of Rainbow Five, the top-secret war plan drawn up at Roosevelt’s request by the joint board of the United States Army and Navy. Manly’s story even contained a copy of President Roosevelt’s letter ordering the preparation of the plan.
Rainbow Five called for the creation of a 10-million-man army, including an expeditionary force of 5 million men that would invade Europe in 1943 to defeat Germany. On December 5, 1941, the German Embassy in Washington, D.C., cabled the entire transcript of the newspaper story to Berlin. The story was reviewed and analyzed in Berlin as “the Roosevelt War Plan.” On December 6, 1941, Adm. Erich Raeder submitted a report to Hitler prepared by his staff that analyzed the Rainbow Five plan. Raeder concluded the most important point contained in Rainbow Five was the fact that the United States would not be ready to launch a military offensive against Germany until July 1943.
On December 9, 1941, Hitler returned to Berlin from the Russian front and plunged into two days of conferences with Raeder, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, and Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring. The three advisors stressed that the Rainbow Five plan showed that the United States was determined to defeat Germany. They pointed out that Rainbow Five stated that the United States would undertake to carry on the war against Germany alone even if Russia collapsed and Britain surrendered to Germany. The three advisors leaned toward Adm. Raeder’s view that an air and U-boat offensive against both British and American ships might be risky, but that the United States was already unquestionably an enemy.
On December 9, 1941, Roosevelt made a radio address to the nation that is seldom mentioned in the history books. In addition to numerous uncomplimentary remarks about Hitler and Nazism, Roosevelt accused Hitler of urging Japan to attack the United States. Roosevelt declared:
We know that Germany and Japan are conducting their military and naval operations with a joint plan. Germany and Italy consider themselves at war with the United States without even bothering about a formal declaration…Your government knows Germany has been telling Japan that if Japan would attack the United States, Japan would share the spoils when peace came. She was promised by Germany that if she came in, she would receive control of the whole Pacific area and that means not only the Far East, but all the islands of the Pacific and also a stranglehold on the west coast of North and Central and South America.
All of the above statements are obviously lies. Germany and Japan did not have a joint naval plan before Pearl Harbor, and never concocted one for the rest of the war. Germany did not have foreknowledge and certainly never encouraged Japan to attack the United States. Japan never had any ambition to attack the west coast of North, Central, or South America. Germany also never promised anything to Japan in the Far East. Germany’s power in the Far East was negligible.
Roosevelt concluded in his speech on December 9, 1941:
We expect to eliminate the danger from Japan, but it would serve us ill if we accomplished that and found that the rest of the world was dominated by Hitler and Mussolini. So, we are going to win the war and we are going to win the peace that follows.
On December 10, 1941, when Hitler resumed his conference with Raeder, Keitel, and Göring, Hitler said that Roosevelt’s speech confirmed everything in the Tribune story. Hitler considered Roosevelt’s speech to be a de facto declaration of war. Since war with the United States was inevitable, Hitler felt he had no choice but to declare war on the United States.
McMeekin describes Hitler’s unilateral declaration of war on the United States as “a move so self-sabotaging as to defy explanation to this day.” McMeekin writes: “Some have suggested that Rainbow Five was leaked by the president himself to goad Hitler into declaring war. If true, this was a brilliant political coup.”
The truth, however, is that Roosevelt did everything in his power to plunge the United States into war against Germany. In addition to the Lend-Lease Act and numerous other provocations, Roosevelt eventually went so far as to order American vessels to shoot-on-sight German and Italian vessels—a flagrant act of war. Hitler had wanted to avoid war with the United States at all costs. Hitler expressly ordered German submarines to avoid conflicts with U.S. warships, except to prevent imminent destruction. It appeared that Hitler’s efforts would be successful in keeping the United States out of the war against Germany.
Hitler, however, declared war on the United States after the leaked Rainbow Five plan convinced him that war with the United States was inevitable. It was not a self-sabotaging move as McMeekin suggests. The extraordinary cunning of leaking Rainbow Five at the very time he knew a Japanese attack was pending enabled Roosevelt to overcome the American public’s resistance to entering the war. It allowed the entry of the United States into World War II in such a way as to make it appear that Germany and Japan were the aggressor nations.
The Holocaust Hoax
Establishment historians all uphold the official Holocaust story. For example, historian Brendan Simms writes: “Finally, Hitler’s central role in the murder of 6 million Jews has been proven beyond all doubt by Richard Evans, Peter Longerich and others involved in the rebuttal of David Irving’s claims to the contrary.” In reality, as I have shown in previous articles for Inconvenient History, Richard Evans and Peter Longerich have never proven that 6 million Jews were murdered in the so-called Holocaust.
McMeekin also believes in the Holocaust story and makes numerous references to the “Holocaust” in Stalin’s War. For example, he writes: “Stalin’s intentions in stipulating various categories of kulak (capitalist) peasant households fit for deportation may not have been as explicitly murderous as the Wannsee Protocols (though many Ukrainians, and some historians, now believe they were), but the results were unquestionably genocidal.” As I have shown in an article for Inconvenient History, contrary to McMeekin’s statement, there is no “explicitly murderous” language in the Wannsee Protocols.
McMeekin also states that Hitler’s greatest crime was the ongoing mass murder of European Jewry, which had begun on the eastern front in 1941, and picked up momentum with the construction of death camps in German-occupied Poland in 1942. He writes:
To this day, controversy rages about what might have been done to slow down the Holocaust, whether via Allied bombing runs on the train lines running to the death camps of Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka, and Auschwitz or, in one gruesome what-if scenario, by aerial bombing of the camps themselves—the idea being that even death by friendly fire was preferable to the terrible fate that awaited Jews, Roma, and others gassed by the Germans.
McMeekin fails to acknowledge in this passage that there were no homicidal gas chambers in any of the German camps, and that Germany did not have a program of genocide against Jews during World War II.
McMeekin also uses the so-called Holocaust as a partial reason why U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau recommended his infamous Morgenthau Plan. He writes:
Morgenthau’s own blood was clearly up, at least in part out of genuine conviction. The secretary was Jewish, which gave him a personal stake in holding Hitler and the Germans responsible for the ongoing mass murder of European Jewry. Like Roosevelt with unconditional surrender in 1943, Morgenthau had sincere personal reasons for advocating the policy line that he did, even if it did dovetail neatly with Soviet foreign policy objectives.
Contrary to McMeekin’s statement, Germany did not have an ongoing program of mass murder of European Jewry. The “Holocaust” should not be used as a partial excuse for the American adoption of the lethal Morgenthau Plan.
McMeekin also credits the Soviet liberation of Auschwitz-Birkenau with saving Jewish lives. He writes: “By month’s end, Soviet troops had also liberated Auschwitz-Birkenau, saving about 7,500 emaciated Jewish survivors of this soon-notorious Nazi death camp.” Contrary to McMeekin’s statement, since Germany did not have an extermination program against Jews, the Soviets did not save any Jewish lives when they liberated Auschwitz-Birkenau. The Germans, if they had an extermination program, could have gassed and cremated the remaining Jews in crematorium V at Auschwitz-Birkenau during the first week of January 1945 before the Soviets arrived.
Finally, McMeekin writes: “In late September, after the Germans occupied Kiev, more than 33,000 Jews were slaughtered at Babi Yar outside the city, in a grim foreshadowing of still greater horrors to come.”
However, as I have shown in a previous article for Inconvenient History, an air photo taken of the ravine of Babi Yar on September 26, 1943 shows a placid and peaceful valley. Neither the vegetation nor the topography has been disturbed by human intervention. There are no burning sites, no smoke, no excavations, no fuel depots, and no access roads for the transport of humans or fuel. We can conclude with certainty from this photo that no part of Babi Yar was subjected to topographical changes of any magnitude right up to the Soviet reoccupation of the area. Hence, the mass graves and mass cremations attested to by witnesses at Babi Yar did not take place.
Hitler’s Preemptive Invasion of the Soviet Union
McMeekin also questions whether Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, was made for preemptive reasons. He writes: “The proximate cause for this decision, judging from Hitler’s remarks at the time and subsequently, was Stalin’s effort to blackmail him in November and December 1940, not anything related to Soviet mobilization.”
Hitler, however, made it very clear in his speech on December 11, 1941, why he had invaded the Soviet Union. Hitler said:
When I became aware of the possibility of a threat to the east of the Reich in 1940 through reports from the British House of Commons and by observations of Soviet Russian troop movements on our frontiers, I immediately ordered the formation of many new armored, motorized and infantry divisions. The human and material resources for them were abundantly available….
We realized very clearly that under no circumstances could we allow the enemy the opportunity to strike first into our heart. Nevertheless, the decision in this case was a very difficult one. When the writers for the democratic newspapers now declare that I would have thought twice before attacking if I had known the strength of the Bolshevik adversaries, they show that they do not understand either the situation or me.
I have not sought war. To the contrary, I have done everything to avoid conflict. But I would forget my duty and my conscience if I were to do nothing in spite of the realization that a conflict had become unavoidable. Because I regarded Soviet Russia as a danger not only for the German Reich but for all of Europe, I decided, if possible, to give the order myself to attack a few days before the outbreak of this conflict.
A truly impressive amount of authentic material is now available which confirms that a Soviet Russian attack was intended. We are also sure about when this attack was to take place. In view of this danger, the extent of which we are perhaps only now truly aware, I can only thank the Lord God that He enlightened me in time and has given me the strength to do what must be done. Millions of German soldiers may thank Him for their lives, and all of Europe for its existence.
I may say this today: If this wave of more than 20,000 tanks, hundreds of divisions, tens of thousands of artillery pieces, along with more than 10,000 airplanes, had not been kept from being set into motion against the Reich, Europe would have been lost.
Hitler was speaking the truth in this speech. McMeekin also mentions numerous facts in Stalin’s War that support Hitler’s claim that his invasion of the Soviet Union was made for preemptive reasons. For example, McMeekin writes: “As noted earlier, the Red Army had lost 20,500 tanks between June and November 1941, amounting to 80% of Stalin’s armored strength.” This confirms Hitler’s statement that the Soviet Union had more than 20,000 tanks available to attack Europe.
McMeekin writes that, in November 1939, the Red Army was the largest, most mechanized, most heavily armored, and most lavishly armed army in the world. The Soviet economy had been on a war footing since the first Five-Year Plan was inaugurated in 1928. McMeekin writes:
The production targets of the third Five-Year Plan, launched in 1938, were breathtaking, envisioning the production of 50,000 warplanes annually by the end of 1942, along with 125,000 air engines and 700,000 tons of aerial bombs; 60,775 tanks, 119,060 artillery systems, 450,000 machine guns, and 5.2 million rifles; 489 million artillery shells, 120,000 tons of naval armor, and 1 million tons of explosives; and, for good measure, 298,000 tons of chemical weapons. While not all of these targets were realistic or met, progress in the most critical areas—such as tanks, anti-tank guns, and warplanes—was striking. By the end of 1940, the Red Army deployed 23,307 operational tanks, 15,000 45 mm anti-tank guns, and 22,171 warplanes, with thousands more state-of-the-art models of each coming on line in 1941. In these areas, the Red Army was the world’s most formidable. The Wehrmacht, by comparison, had only 3,387 panzers on hand prior to the invasion of France in May 1940…
The offensive nature of Stalin’s army is confirmed in a speech Stalin made on May 5, 1941, to an elite audience of 2,000 military academy graduates in the Andreevsky Hall in the Moscow Kremlin. Stalin said that, since the Soviet-Finnish war, the USSR had “reconstructed our army and armed it with modern military equipment.” The Red Army had grown from 120 to more than 300 divisions, with greatly improved Soviet tanks, artillery, aviation, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns.
The head of the Frunze Military Academy, Lt. Gen. M. S. Khozin, spoke after Stalin finished his speech. Parroting the Pravda propaganda line of the day, Khozin saluted Stalin for the success of his “peace policy,” which had kept the Soviet Union out of the “capitalist war” raging in Europe and Asia. Before Khozin could finish his speech, Stalin leapt to his feet and reproached Khozin for promoting an “out of date policy.”
Stalin told the officers and party bosses present that the “Soviet peace policy” had bought the Red Army time to modernize and rearm, while also allowing the USSR to “push forward in the west and north, increasing its population by 13 million in the process.” However, Stalin said the days of peaceful absorption of new territory “had come to an end. Not another foot of ground can be gained with such peaceful sentiments.” Stalin continued, “But today, now that our army has been thoroughly reconstructed, fully outfitted for fighting a modern war, now that we are strong—now we must shift from defense to offense.”
Hitler invaded the Soviet Union to prevent Stalin’s planned invasion of Germany and all of Europe. For more information on this subject, I recommend the book The Chief Culprit: Stalin’s Grand Design to Start World War II by Viktor Suvorov.
McMeekin correctly writes that large numbers of Soviet and Communist agents infiltrated the U.S. government during Roosevelt’s administration. A critical factor enabling this infiltration was Roosevelt’s recognition of Stalin’s regime, which removed the stigma from Communist Party membership. McMeekin says another factor in this infiltration was Soviet opportunism, enabled by the Roosevelt administration’s lax security.
In this author’s opinion, however, it was Roosevelt’s enthusiastic support of Stalin’s regime rather than lax security that allowed Soviet agents to infiltrate the U.S. government. Roosevelt was always a good friend of Josef Stalin. Roosevelt indulged in provocative name-calling against the heads of totalitarian nations such as Germany, Italy and Japan, but never against Stalin or the Soviet Union. Roosevelt always spoke favorably of Stalin, and American wartime propaganda referred to Stalin affectionately as “Uncle Joe.”
Roosevelt’s attitude toward Stalin is remarkable considering that his first appointed ambassador to the Soviet Union, William Bullitt, warned Roosevelt of the danger of supporting Stalin. Bullitt served as America’s first ambassador to the Soviet Union from November 1933 to 1936. Bullitt left the Soviet Union with few illusions, and by the end of his tenure he was openly hostile to the Soviet government. Bullitt stated in his final report from Moscow on April 20, 1936, that the Russian standard of living was possibly lower than that of any other country in the world. Bullitt reported that the Bulgarian Comintern leader, Dimitrov, had admitted that the Soviet popular front and collective security tactics were aimed at undermining the foreign capitalist systems. Bullitt concluded that relations of sincere friendship between the Soviet Union and the United States were impossible.
Roosevelt was fully aware of the slave-labor system, the liquidation of the kulaks, the man-made famine, the extreme poverty and backwardness, and the extensive system of espionage and terror that existed in the Soviet Union. However, from the very beginning of his administration, Roosevelt sang the praises of a regime which recognized no civil liberties whatsoever. In an attempt to gain swift Congressional approval for Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union, Roosevelt even said that Stalin’s regime was at the forefront of “peace and democracy in the world.” At a White House press conference, Roosevelt also claimed that there was freedom of religion in the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union had been a totalitarian regime since 1920. By the time Hitler’s National Socialist Party came to power in 1933, the Soviet government had already murdered millions of its own citizens. The Soviet terror campaign accelerated in the late 1930s, resulting in the murder of many more millions of Soviet citizens as well as thousands of American citizens working in the Soviet Union. Many Americans lost their entire families in the Soviet purge of the late 1930s. Despite these well-documented facts, the Roosevelt administration fully supported the Soviet Union.
Roosevelt was basically in the Soviet’s pocket. He admired Stalin, and sought his favor. Roosevelt thought the Soviet Union indispensable in the war, crucial to bringing world peace after it, and he wanted the Soviets handled with kid gloves. The Russians hardly could have done better if Roosevelt was a Soviet spy. Thus, it was not lax security, but rather Roosevelt’s enthusiastic support of Stalin’s regime that caused so many Soviet agents to infiltrate the U.S. government.
McMeekin in Stalin’s War makes another statement I don’t agree with. In regard to British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s speech on March 31, 1939, guaranteeing Poland’s independence, McMeekin writes: “Hitler read the loose guarantee of Polish ‘independence’ as a green light for adjusting Poland’s borders.” Hitler, however, invaded Poland only because of numerous atrocities committed by the Polish government against the German minority in Poland that occurred after Chamberlain’s speech guaranteeing Poland’s independence.
McMeekin also twice incorrectly states that Gen. Sir Alan Brooke was Winston Churchill’s air chief. Actually, Sir Arthur Harris was the commander-in-chief of British Bomber Command from February 23, 1942 until the end of the war.
Despite my disagreement with some of McMeekin’s statements in Stalin’s War, I thoroughly enjoyed reading this book. McMeekin has done extensive research that is not found in many World War II history books. He has properly shown Stalin to be the primary aggressor and beneficiary of the Second World War.
 McMeekin, Sean, Stalin’s War: A New History of World War II, New York: Basic Books, 2021, pp. 1, 5.
 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
 Ibid., pp. 2, 658.
 Chamberlain, William Henry, America’s Second Crusade, Chicago: Regnery, 1950, p. 130.
 Sanborn, Frederic R., “Roosevelt is Frustrated in Europe,” in Barnes, Harry Elmer (ed.), Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, Newport Beach, Cal: Institute for Historical Review, 1993, pp. 217-218.
 Ibid., p. 218.
 Chamberlain, William Henry, America’s Second Crusade, Chicago: Regnery, 1950, pp. 147-148.
 Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79 Cong., 2 sess., 39 parts; Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946, Part V, p. 2295.
 Churchill, Winston S., The Grand Alliance, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950, pp. 492-493.
 Chamberlain, William Henry, America’s Second Crusade, Chicago: Regnery, 1950, pp. 148-149.
 Newsweek, November 10, 1941, p. 35.
 Meskill, Johanna Menzel, Hitler and Japan: The Hollow Alliance, New York: 1955, p. 40.
 Fleming, Thomas, The New Dealers’ War: FDR and the War within World War II, New York: Basic Books, 2001, p. 1.
 Ibid., pp. 1-2, 33.
 Ibid., pp. 33-34.
 Ibid., pp. 34-35.
 Meskill, Johana Menzel, Hitler and Japan: The Hollow Alliance, New York: 1955, pp. 1-47.
 McMeekin, Sean, Stalin’s War: A New History of World War II, New York: Basic Books, 2021, p. 386.
 Simms, Brendan, Hitler: A Global Biography, New York: Basic Books, 2019, p. xxi.
 Wear, John, “Peter Longerich on the ‘Holocaust,’“ Inconvenient History, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2021 and Wear, John, “Richard J. Evans: The New Wave of ‘Court’ Historian,” Inconvenient History, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2021.
 McMeekin, Sean, Stalin’s War: A New History of World War II, New York: Basic Books, 2021, pp. 26-27.
 Wear, John, “Wannsee: The Road to the Final Solution,” Inconvenient History, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2022.
 McMeekin, Sean, Stalin’s War: A New History of World War II, New York: Basic Books, 2021, p. 448.
 See Wear, John, “The Chemistry of Auschwitz/Birkenau,” Inconvenient History, Vol. 9, No. 4, 2017.
 McMeekin, Sean, Stalin’s War: A New History of World War II, New York: Basic Books, 2021, p. 571.
 Ibid., p. 600.
 Mattogno, Carlo, Auschwitz: The Case for Sanity, Washington, D.C.: The Barnes Review, 2010, p. 558.
 McMeekin, Sean, Stalin’s War: A New History of World War II, New York: Basic Books, 2021, p. 322.
 Wear, John, “Babi Yar,” Inconvenient History, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2018.
 McMeekin, Sean, Stalin’s War: A New History of World War II, New York: Basic Books, 2021, p. 280.
 Weber, Mark, “The Reichstag Speech of 11 December 1941: Hitler’s Declaration of War Against the United States,” The Journal of Historical Review, Vol. 8, No. 4, Winter 1988-1989, pp. 395-396.
 McMeekin, Sean, Stalin’s War: A New History of World War II, New York: Basic Books, 2021, p. 381.
 Ibid., p. 119.
 Ibid., pp. 219-220.
 Ibid., pp. 7-9.
 Ibid., p. 9.
 Suvorov, Viktor, The Chief Culprit: Stalin’s Grand Design to Start World War II, Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2008.
 McMeekin, Sean, Stalin’s War: A New History of World War II, New York: Basic Books, 2021, pp. 42-43.
 Fish, Hamilton, FDR The Other Side of the Coin: How We Were Tricked into World War II, New York: Vantage Press, 1976, pp. 8, 16.
 Hoggan, David L., The Forced War: When Peaceful Revision Failed, Costa Mesa, Cal.: Institute for Historical Review, 1989, p. 423.
 Tzouliadis, Tim, The Forsaken: An American Tragedy in Stalin’s Russia, New York: The Penguin Press, 2008, p. 204.
 Ibid., pp. 100-102, 105, 127.
 Wilcox, Robert K., Target: Patton, Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2008, pp. 250-251.
 McMeekin, Sean, Stalin’s War: A New History of World War II, New York: Basic Books, 2021, p. 71.
 Wear, John, “Why Germany Invaded Poland,” Inconvenient History, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2019.
 McMeekin, Sean, Stalin’s War: A New History of World War II, New York: Basic Books, 2021, pp. 500, 506.